



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

19 January 1962

Honorable Richard B. Russell
Chairman, Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Russell:

I am happy to respond at the Armed Services Committee's request to the statement Senator Eugene J. McCarthy made on 18 January 1962 at the opening of the Committee's hearings on my nomination to the position of Director of Central Intelligence. I shall respond directly to the specific questions posed by Senator McCarthy at the end of his statement, but as other portions of the statement were considered during the hearings I shall also set forth my position in regard to them.

The first question asked if the Central Intelligence Agency is to be reorganized and if so in what respects. I have been and I am studying the organization of the Agency very intently. The present pattern of organization of the Agency is the result of years of study by competent people, both within the Government and outside consultants, and in my opinion it is not a bad pattern of organization. However, I believe that in all departments of the Government there is an evolution in management procedures and opportunity for improvement so I think that some changes will be indicated in the Agency organization. I would propose to discuss any important changes with our congressional Subcommittees.

During the hearings before your Committee I read into the record a letter from the President concerning the scope of the responsibilities he has asked me to assume, and the President stated therein that he would expect me to delegate to a principal deputy as I may deem necessary so much of the direction of the

detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit me to carry out the primary task of the Director of Central Intelligence. This, of course, I intend to do and while I will have over-all responsibility for the Agency, I am studying what delegations of authority should be made to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

Senator McCarthy's second question asked what bearing such changes would have upon the duties of the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and upon the operation of the Agency. Any changes made in Agency organization will have no bearing on the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, the scope of whose responsibilities is set forth in the Presidential letter mentioned above. The authority of the Director has been neither enhanced nor diluted, and I believe the purpose of the President's directive is to make clear that the Director of Central Intelligence is his principal intelligence officer to exercise the dual role set forth in the law, to be responsible for the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency itself, and to assure the coordination of the intelligence community as a whole. The one change that has been made is in connection with the coordination function. The Director of Central Intelligence is Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, which is composed of the heads of all the intelligence components of the Government, and I have placed the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on that Board to represent the views of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with any matters considered by the Board. It appeared to me that if I served as Chairman and as such as the President's representative and the Deputy as the Agency's representative was the advocate of the Agency's viewpoints I would be in a position to take a more objective point of view. This new arrangement was approved by the President in the letter referred to above.

Senator McCarthy's third question asks for my views as to the authority for some of the actions attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency in the field of foreign affairs within recent years. Many events have been attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency over the years, and it would be impossible for me to have the facts on these matters, but I certainly do not accept that because they are attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency the Agency is responsible for them. The Senator's question appears to go to the basic juridical or constitutional authorities of the Executive Branch, and this involves profound

legal questions which, since I am not a lawyer, I do not feel competent to debate. It is my understanding, however, that the President has wide powers in the field of foreign relations and within the framework of the constitution is empowered to do what he deems to be necessary to protect and promote the national interest. At the present time, in my opinion, the national interest is best served by taking steps to deter the encroachment of communism. As provided by law the Central Intelligence Agency operates under the direction of the National Security Council which is advisory to the President and of which he is Chairman and, therefore, it is but one of the arms in the complex of establishments which are involved in the President's conduct of foreign policy. I intend to carry out to the best of my ability all duties assigned, and I must assume that no such assignment would cause me to violate my oath of office to support and defend the constitution.

Senator McCarthy's fourth question concerns my judgment as to methods which can be justifiably used by the Central Intelligence Agency. The very nature of the question is such that I believe I cannot respond to it, particularly in the light of the responsibility imposed upon me by law to assure the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Senator McCarthy's fifth question was to the extent of my involvement, if any, in what had been described or reported as "leaks" from the Atomic Energy Commission with reference to the moratorium on nuclear testing. I know of no instance where I personally or any of the Commissioners were charged by anyone with leaking anything either on this subject or any other subject of a classified nature. There were leaks in this area, but there were none that were attributed to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Senator McCarthy's sixth question inquired as to the facts with regard to the charge that I attempted to have scientists fired at the California Institute of Technology. Ten scientists at Cal Tech signed a statement concerning suspension of nuclear testing. I differed strongly with their position and felt that the manner in which the statement came out tended to imply that it was an official Cal Tech position. I wrote my letter stating my strong disagreement to one of the ten scientists directly, Dr. Thomas Lauritsen. To the best of my recollection I did not send copies of this letter

to the university or officials thereof, and the file carbon which I retained does not indicate any distribution. I would be less than candid if I did not say that my views concerning this matter were known to many people. However, I did not officially or unofficially request the dismissal of any or all of the scientists by the Institute, and none were dismissed as a result of any action by me.

The general thrust of Senator McCarthy's statement was the need for greater congressional supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency, and early in his statement he said there is no regular or normal procedure in existence or in use today by which committees of the Congress are consulted or informed of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities. There are, of course, Subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees of both the Senate and the House, constituted as CIA Subcommittees, and there are Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees of both the Senate and the House, constituted to consider the Central Intelligence Agency's appropriations matters. The Central Intelligence Agency has been at all times responsive to the calls of these Subcommittees and in addition has brought to their attention matters the Agency felt should properly be considered by them. I will continue this policy and this relationship with these Subcommittees.


Senator McCarthy's statement quoted a comment by Hanson Baldwin that intelligence is too important to be left to the unsupervised. In addition to the relationship with the Subcommittees of the Congress set forth above, the Agency reports to the National Security Council and is subject to direction by the National Security Council. There are precise interdepartmental arrangements for consideration of certain of the Agency's activities so that the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense can apply policy guidance and be adequately informed.

Senator McCarthy also sets forth a quotation from Walter Lippmann stating that the Central Intelligence Agency has been much too often an original source of American foreign policy. I do not consider that the Director of Central Intelligence is a policy-making position. The chief function of the Agency is to obtain all possible facts from all sources and after proper evaluation disseminate them to the President and other appropriate policymakers. I might be asked my personal views, and if so

I would feel free to give them but do not conceive that it is proper for the Director of Central Intelligence to volunteer in regard to questions concerning the national policy. Within the intelligence structure there are, of course, from time to time policy questions concerning organization or methods, but these are not related and, therefore, must be clearly differentiated from matters of national policy and are settled internally through the mechanism of the United States Intelligence Board.

I trust the foregoing will serve the needs of the Committee.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John A. McCone". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the beginning and a long horizontal stroke at the end.

John A. McCone
Director